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Abstract—Information-theoretical security of quantum key 
distribution (QKD) has been convincingly proven in recent years 
and remarkable experiments have shown the potential of QKD for 
real world applications. Due to its unique capability of combining 
high key rate and security in a realistic finite-size scenario, the 
efficient version of the BB84 QKD protocol endowed with decoy 
states has been subject of intensive research. Its recent 
experimental implementation finally demonstrated a secure key 
rate beyond 1 Mbps over a 50 km optical fiber. However the 
achieved rate holds under the restrictive assumption that the 
eavesdropper performs collective attacks. Here, we review the 
protocol and generalize its security. We exploit a map by Ahrens 
to rigorously upper bound the Hypergeometric distribution 
resulting from a general eavesdropping. Despite the extended 
applicability of the new protocol, its key rate is only marginally 
smaller than its predecessor in all cases of practical interest.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
UANTUM key distribution (QKD) [1], [2] in two decades 
has progressed considerably and reached a maturity 
suitable for real-world use. Fundamental achievements have 
been obtained in QKD theory and experiments [3]-[12]. On the 
theoretical side, security proofs have been extended beyond the 
“asymptotic scenario”, accounting for the fact that real data 
samples are always finite and subject to statistical fluctuations 
[13]-[19]. This led to an operational definition of the security of 
QKD, aimed at quantifying through an ?-value the deviation of 
a real system from an ideal one. On the experimental side, QKD 
systems capable of achieving ?-values as small as 10-10 have 
been developed [20]-[24].  
In order to bring QKD technology closer to real-world 
deployment, it is necessary to further reconcile the requirements 
of the theory with those of a real-world implementation, such 
as high key rate generation and low manufacturing costs. 
Therefore QKD protocols are continuously refined to approach 
the desired levels of efficiency and security.  
Here, we review and extend a version of the efficient BB84 
protocol [25]-[27] endowed with decoy states [28]-[31], 
recently introduced and experimentally realized in [24], which 
provides a key rate beyond 1 Mbps over a 50 km optical fiber 
with an ?-value of 10???. This key rate was obtained under the 
limiting assumption that Eve performs collective attacks [1], 
[2]. In this case, the measured QKD quantities were represented 
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by independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random 
variables that were bounded using the Clopper-Pearson (CP) 
confidence interval [32]-[34] for the Binomial distribution. By 
combining such bounds with the proof method described in [4], 
[7] and refined in [17]-[19], the security of the protocol was 
finally obtained. 
Recently, a class of QKD protocols have been proven secure 
using the uncertainty relation for smooth entropies [35], [36]: 
????? ??|?? + ????? ??|?′? ≥ ??	. (1) 
Eq. (1) holds if the transmitter is endowed with a perfect single 
photon source. The parameter ? ∈ ?0,1? is a quality factor 
related to the bias between the bases used by the transmitter 
[36]. If the emitted states are in two mutually unbiased bases, 
e.g. ? and ?, like in the ideal BB84 protocol, then ? = 1. The 
conditional smooth min entropy ????? ??|?? quantifies how 
many random bits are contained in ? that are independent of 
Eve and ?-close to a uniform distribution, with ? ≥ 0 the 
smoothing parameter [37]. ????? ??|?′?, the conditional smooth 
max entropy, gives the number of additional bits necessary to 
reconstruct ? from ?′ with failure probability ?. The key rate 
resulting from Eq. (1) is secure under general attacks so it can 
be used to drop the assumption of collective attacks from the 
efficient decoy-state BB84 protocol, as in [38]. 
However, additional work is required to guarantee security 
against the most general attack related to how the QKD 
quantities are sampled in a situation where the size of the 
sample is finite. The sampled quantities are random variables 
obeying a given distribution, in most cases Binomial, due to the 
two-valued nature of QKD observables. The Binomial 
distribution well represents experimental results under the i.i.d. 
assumption, or when measurements can be described as an 
operation of sampling with replacement. In some cases, 
however, this kind of sampling is not possible even in principle, 
for example, when sampling in the basis ? prevents sampling 
in the complementary basis ?, or vice versa [35], [39]. Under 
these circumstances, sampling without replacement has to be 
considered instead, and the Binomial distribution has to be 
replaced by the Hypergeometric distribution [35]. 
Below, we review the protocol of Ref. [24] and show its 
security under Eq. (1), along the lines described in [35] and 
[38]. We generalize the estimation procedure so as to cover both 
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the Binomial and the Hypergeometric distributions. This is 
done using a map by Ahrens described in [40]. It allows to 
reduce the general case to one that deals with Binomial 
distributions only. In turn, this allows to continue using the CP 
confidence interval for the Binomial distribution to provide 
worst-case bounds to the parameters of the protocol, as it was 
done in [24]. 
In Section II, we give some preliminary description of the 
Ahrens map and the CP confidence interval for the Binomial 
distribution. In Section III, we provide a detailed description of 
our protocol. In Section IV, we discuss the protocol security. 
Section V is left for the concluding remarks.  
II. PRELIMINARIES 
In the following, we give the basic notions about the Ahrens 
map and the CP confidence interval for the Binomial 
distribution. We will use them later for the protocol description 
and the security analysis.  
A. The Ahrens map 
Consider a total population of ? balls in an urn containing ? 
white balls and ? − ? black balls. A sample of ? elements (? <?) is drawn at random from the urn. A success is when a white 
ball is selected. If the sampled elements are not replaced in the 
urn, then the probability to draw ? white balls is given by the 
Hypergeometric distribution (HG): 
HG??, ?, ?, ?? = ???? ?? − ?? − ? ? ?????  , (2) 
which is positive for max	?0, ? − ? + ?? ≤ ? ≤ min??, ??. If 
the sampled elements are replaced in the urn, the probability of 
a successful event is constant, equal to ? = ?/?, and the 
probability to draw ? white balls from the urn is given by the 
Binomial distribution (BI): 
BI??, ?, ?? = ???? ???1 − ?????	,	 (3) 
which is positive for 0 ≤ ? ≤ ?.  
The Ahrens map [40] is a permutation of the parameters ?, ?, ? − ?,? − ? so to obtain a new BI with the following 
property:   
 HG??, ?, ?, ?? ≤ √2	BI???, ?/?, ???, (4) 
where the tilde indicates the permuted parameters, as defined 
by the following selection rules: 
?? = min??, ?, ? − ?,? − ??  
IF  ?? = ? ∨ ?? − ?? THEN ? = min??,? − ??  
IF ?? = ? ∨ ?? − ?? THEN ? = min??, ? − ??. (5) 
The permutation of the parameters is always possible, so there 
is no need to specify a range of application for it. In the top 
diagram of Fig. 1 we illustrate the Ahrens map, using a 
particular choice of the parameters. The curve ??? is the 
distribution of ? according to BI??, ?/?, ??; the curve ???? is 
HG??, ?, ?, ??; the curve ????? is the upper bound √2	BI???, ?/
?, ??? provided by the permuted BI distribution. The standard 
BI distribution has a larger variance than the corresponding HG, 
but it does not upper bound it on the whole range. On the 
contrary, the permuted BI distribution multiplied by √2 is 
always above the HG, so it can be used to upper bound it.  
In some cases, the standard BI still provides bounds that are 
looser than those of the permuted BI. Our system automatically 
selects the loosest bounds, for each QKD session, so to 
guarantee the highest security level. This also simplifies the 
analysis because we only have to deal with BI distributions, 
either permuted or not.      
B. CP confidence interval 
Consider a sequence of Bernoulli experiments in which the 
probability to obtain a success is constant, ?. A sample of ? 
elements would then provide ? successes with the probability 
specified in Eq. (3). 
Rather than obtaining the probability for ? successes, we are 
interested in confidence bounds for ?, assessing that for any ? >
0, the true value of ? belongs to the interval ??, ?? with 
confidence ≥ 1 − ?, where ?, ? are lower and upper bounds to 
the number of successes, respectively. This is obtained by 
solving in ? the following equations for the cumulative BI 
distribution [32], [41]: 
??? ≤ ?? = ∑ ???? ???1 − ????????? = ? , (6) 
??? ≥ ?? = ∑ ???? ???1 − ????????? = ? . (7) 
The solutions of Eqs. (6) and (7) are respectively ? and ?, and 
can be efficiently computed [41]. When the above equations are 
simultaneously solved, the resulting CP confidence interval 
contains ? with probability 1 − 2?. When the permuted BI is 
used to bound a HG distribution, Eqs. (6), (7) have to be solved 
with ?/√2 replacing ?, in order to obtain results with the same 
confidence. The system resets from ? to ?/√2 automatically, if 
necessary.  
In the bottom diagram of Fig. 1, we pictorially illustrate the 
lower bounds obtained though the CP approach, for the same 
probability distributions considered in the top diagram of Fig. 
1. Lower bounds with confidence 1 − ? are given by the 
intersections of the cumulative functions with the line ?. In the 
example of the figure, the loosest bound is provided by the non-
permuted BI distribution, labelled with ???. So, in this case, our 
system would automatically select this bound to assess the 
security of the protocol. However, it is not always guaranteed 
that the non-permuted BI distribution upper bounds the HG 
distribution, labelled with ????. For that, we can use the upper 
bound provided by the Ahrens map, Eq. (4), labelled with ?????. 
III. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION 
In this Section, we modify the protocol described in Ref. [24] 
in order to generalize its security. In the following, we adopt a 
basis index ? = {??, ??} = {?, ?} to indicate the bases chosen 
by the users, and a class index ? = {??, ??, ??} = {?, ?, ?} to 
indicate the intensity, or photon flux, used by the transmitter in 
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preparing the light pulses. We denote “signal” (?), “decoy” (?) 
and “vacuum” (?) the three intensity classes used. Usually, ? >? > ? ≥ 0. The basis will be chosen with probability ?? ?
?? ? 1 ? ??  and the class with probability ?? ? ?? ? ?? ?
1 ? ?? ? ??. We assume that the transmitter has a phase-
randomised source of coherent states [42], [43] and that the 
intensity of the light pulses can be set with arbitrarily high 
precision. This makes the light source statistically equivalent to 
a Poissonian distribution of number states such that the 
probability to send a light pulse containing ? photons is 
?????/?!. All the steps of the protocol and its final rate will be 
specified assuming the key bits are distilled only from the 
majority class ? and the majority basis ?. With minor 
modifications, key bits can be distilled from other classes and 
from ? basis too. This extra resource can be useful when the 
basis ratio ??/?? approaches 1 or when ??, ?? and ?? have 
comparable magnitudes. The choice of a single basis is dictated 
by practicality considerations and is not necessary for security. 
A. Transmitter 
With probability ??, the transmitter (Alice) prepares a phase-
randomised coherent state with intensity ?. She then selects a 
basis b with probability ??  and a bit value 0 or 1 with 
probability 50%. She uses these values to encode a state that is 
sent to the receiver over the quantum channel. 
B. Receiver 
The receiver (Bob) chooses a basis b with the same 
probability ??  as Alice and then measures the incoming state 
using two threshold detectors ?? and ??. If no detector clicks, 
a vacuum count is recorded; if only detector ?? (??) clicks, a 
bit value 0 (1) is recorded; if both detectors click, a random bit 
value, 0 or 1, is assigned and recorded [44], [45]. 
C. Reconciliation and determination of samples size 
After a predetermined number of ? states have been sent by 
Alice and measured by Bob, users analyse the statistics 
associated to the states over an authenticated public channel. 
The very first time, the channel can be authenticated using a 
pre-shared secret string and universal2 hashing [46]. Then, the 
secret string can be regenerated from the quantum key at every 
new session. At first, Bob discloses bases and timestamps of his 
non-vacuum counts. Then Alice announces bases and classes 
for these counts, together with the bit values in the ? basis and 
in the decoy and vacuum pulses. With these information, users 
form raw keys from all the counts in the class ? ? ? and 
matched bases ?? ? ?? ? ?, where ?? and ?? refer to Alice and 
Bob, respectively, and ?, ? ? ?1,2?. The length of the raw keys 
is denoted as ???? . Similarly, the size of the set of non-vacuum 
counts with generic class and bases is denoted as ??????. The 
users can measure these quantities exactly.  
From public communication, users can also compute the 
exact quantities ???? , i.e. the total number of pulses in the class 
? and in the same basis ?? ? ?? ? ?. In some cases, these 
quantities are very large and it is more practical to estimate 
upper and lower bounds for ????  rather than determining the 
exact value on the classical channel. Due to the large size of the 
samples, the resulting bounds are tight and the confidence level 
very close to unity. To simplify the description, we omit the 
details of this issue in what follows and we just refer to the exact 
values ???? . The drawing of ???? counts from ???? pulses, in 
turn selected from a total population ?, can give rise to a HG 
distribution, as first noted in [35]. As explained in Section II.A, 
the protocol automatically considers this possibility and, if 
necessary, treats it via Eq. (4). Because all the bits for ? basis, 
decoy and vacuum have been revealed, a direct comparison 
between Alice’s and Bob’s strings can tell the exact number of 
errors ????, ???? and ???? .  
The users run a classical error correction (EC) algorithm to 
correct possible errors in the raw keys obtained from signals in 
the ? basis. We call ????  the total number of errors in the raw 
keys and ???  the parity bits revealed in order to correct them. 
After EC, the users verify that error corrected keys are identical 
using universal2 hashing. If the keys are found to be different, 
the protocol aborts and data are discarded. We call ???? the 
probability that the keys are different but the protocol does not 
abort. In some cases, the verification step can be postponed 
until the authentication step, which is also performed using 
universal2 hash functions. As a result of EC and verification, the 
 
Fig. 1.  Comparison between bounds used in the parameter estimation stage of 
QKD. Empty circles, label ???: binomial probability distribution BI??, ?/
?, ?? (top) and corresponding cumulative distribution (bottom). Empty 
squares, label ????: hypergeometric probability distribution HG??, ?, ?, ??
(top) and corresponding cumulative distribution (bottom). Filled circles, label 
?????: upper bound to the hypergeometric distribution (top) and to the 
corresponding cumulative distribution (bottom) by a recalibrated binomial 
distribution 	BI??, ?/?, ??? multiplied by √2. Inset: blow-up of the relevant 
points in the quantification of the security threshold, ?. The number of 
successes, ?, is reported on the horizontal axis. Values used in the diagrams
are: ? ? 120,000, ? ? 103,820, ? ? 600. Typical values in QKD are from 
3 to 7 orders of magnitude greater.  
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users can estimate the number of errors ????  with confidence 
equal to or bigger than 1 − ????.  
D. Bounds to fluctuations and parameter estimation 
At this point, the quantities ???? , ???? and ????  are known 
to the users. They run the following steps to bound the finite-
size fluctuations and estimate the unknown parameters of the 
protocol: 
1. Bound yields and error rate in the minority basis using the 
CP confidence interval. Mean values and bounds are 
respectively ????? = ????/????, ?????, ????? for the yields 
and ????? = ????/???? , ????? for the ? error rate. To obtain 
the bounds, the following distributions are considered.    
For the yields: BI????? , ?????, ????? and HG??,???? , ??????, ?????; for the ? error rate: BI????? , ?????, ????? and HG??,???? , ??????, ?????. The HG distribution is bounded by the corresponding BI 
through the Ahrens map. Worst-case bounds are eventually 
selected, as described in Section II. 
2. Numerical constrained optimization and decoy-state 
technique are combined with the bounds above to estimate 
????? and ?????, i.e. lower and upper bounds of the yields of 
the pulses containing ? photons (? = {0,1}) in the basis ? = {?, ?}. Bounds to the number of k-photon pulses in the 
? basis are then obtained as: ????? = ?????	??????????/?!?, 
????? = ????? 	??????????/?!?. The condition ????? ≫ ????? is 
verified by the users, otherwise the protocol aborts. This 
condition is always met for ?? ≫ ??. 
3. In a similar way, the upper bound to the bit error rate of the 
1-photon pulses in the ? basis, ????,???? , is obtained. This is 
used as upper bound to the phase error rate in the ? basis 
(see Section IV). If ????,????  is larger than a predetermined 
threshold ????,?, protocol aborts. We call ???? the overall 
probability that the protocol aborts.  
In Table I, we summarize all the quantities of the protocol 
together with the confidence level with which they are known, 
obtainable as the complement of the failure probability. 
E. Privacy amplification 
The users apply privacy amplification to their error corrected 
keys until they are left with the following number of bits: 
???? ≤ ????? + ?????? − ?????ℎ?????,?? − ??? − ∆ . (8) 
All the quantities in the above rate equation have been 
previously defined, with the exception of ∆, which amounts to: 
∆= log??2 ????⁄ ? + 6 log??46 ????⁄ ? , (9) 
 
1
 The term 46? in Eq. (9) is due to the use of 6 × 3 + 19 = 37 total 
constraints in the optimization problem, each of which can fail with probability ?, plus 9? due to the proof method in [38]. 
where ???? = 10??? defines the overall secrecy of the protocol1. 
The protocol is ???? + ???? secure, meaning that it is ????-
correct and ????-secret [35]. This definition of security is 
composable and allows to use the quantum key in cryptographic 
applications [37]. 
IV. SECURITY 
The security of the above protocol stems from two aspects. On 
one side, there is the estimation of Eve’s information, quantified 
via the min-entropy [37], [38] and then upper bounded using 
the uncertainty principle [36], Eq. (1), and the max-entropy 
bound [47], [35]. On the other side, there is parameter 
estimation (PE). This is a refinement of the one adopted in [24]. 
However, we need to justify its application in this new context. 
Let us start from a recap of what has been already achieved 
in terms of security for the efficient decoy-state BB84 protocol 
and compare it with our approach. 
A. State of the Art and Comparison 
In [19], the security of the efficient decoy-state BB84 (eds-
BB84) protocol was initially demonstrated using the proof 
method in [17], [18], which holds under the assumption of 
collective attacks by Eve2. Due to non-optimized decoy-state 
2
 It was conjectured that the mentioned proof method holds for general 
attacks too, not only for collective ones. Recently, an attempt to prove this 
conjecture was made in [48] and it was found that a few extra bits have to be 
sacrificed during privacy amplification to go from collective to general attacks. 
TABLE I 
QUANTITIES OF THE PROTOCOL 
Symbol Quantity Failure probability 
? number predetermined triggers exactly known, ∅ 
???  sizes of samples in       class ? and basis ? exactly known to Alice, ∅ 
????  sizes of samples in class ? and matching bases ? 
exactly known in principle 
estimated in practice,  
high confidence 
??????  size of measured count samples exactly known, ∅ 
?????, ????? bounds to the yields for the class ? estimated, 2? 
?????, ????? bounds to the yields of      ?-photon pulses in basis ? estimated, 6? 
?????, ????? bounds to number of         ?-photon pulses in basis ? estimated, 6? 
???? errors in class ? and basis ? estimated, ???? 
??????≠ ????  errors in ????? ≠ ??? exactly known, ∅ 
????? upper bound to ?, ? BER estimated, ? 
????,????  upper bound to ?  QBER of 1-photon pulses estimated, 19? 
????,? predetermined phase error  exactly known, ∅ 
 
Table I. Predetermined, measured and estimated quantities in the protocol, 
with their associated failure probability. 
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bounds, the resulting performance in terms of key rate and 
working distance was quite poor. In [24], [49], the compatibility 
of the mentioned proof method with the CP approach and 
numerical PE was first demonstrated for the eds-BB84 protocol. 
This allowed to improve the decoy-state bounds and achieve 
experimental key rates beyond 1 Mbps over a 50 km optical 
fiber link, still under the condition of collective attacks [24]. In 
[50], the same numerical PE based on BI distribution as in [24] 
and [49] was used3 to prove for the first time the security of the 
eds-BB84 protocol against general attacks, assuming a perfect 
vacuum state prepared by Alice and the quantities analogous to 
????  (see Table I) exactly known. The resulting HG distribution 
was upper bounded by the sum of two BI distributions [50]. 
Later on, a simpler proof of eds-BB84 security against general 
attacks, based on the entropic uncertainty relations [35], [36], 
was provided in [38]. In this case, the PE exploits Hoeffding’s 
inequality [49], which is used to bound observable quantities 
analogous to ???? and ????  in Table I. Also, analytical 
expressions were used to estimate the parameters entering the 
key rate equation. 
Here, we use the entropic uncertainty relations to quantify 
Eve’s information and the CP confidence interval and 
numerical optimization to perform the PE. Differently from 
[50], we use the Ahrens map to tightly bound (within a factor 
√2, see Fig. 1) the HG distribution using a permuted BI 
distribution. This technique allows to always reduce the 
sampling from a HG distribution to one from a BI distribution. 
It is the first time the Ahrens map is used in QKD and we 
believe it represents a useful resource for the practical 
implementation. Moreover, we do not assume a perfect 
preparation of the vacuum state and the exact knowledge of the 
quantities ????  (see Table I and Section III.C). Differently from 
[38], we use numerical optimization for PE. This provides tight 
bounds to the parameters, leading to a high key rate. As an 
indication, we obtain a key rate of 1.128 Mbps over 50 km of 
optical fiber (see Table II). With the same numerical 
parameters, a simulation of the protocol in [38] shows a key rate 
of 1.042 Mbps at 50 km, 7.5% lower. This is remarkable as our 
rate equation, Eq. (8), is more conservative than the one in [38], 
as the coefficient of ℎ?????,?? in Eq. (8), ?????, is larger than the 
one in [38], ?????. Moreover, the key rate in our protocol is only 
due to the signal states sent in the ? basis whereas all states and 
bases are used in [38].  
B. CP confidence interval and constrained optimization 
As aid, in [35] Hoeffding’s inequality [51], [52] and 
analytical expressions were used to upper bound the distance 
between the finite size value of certain quantities measured in 
QKD and their asymptotic values. For example, if ? counts are 
detected from a population of ? pulses prepared by Alice, the 
distance between the measured and the asymptotic values 
(labeled below with an asterisk) according to Hoeffding’s 
 
For this reason we conservatively state that the proof method only guarantees 
security against collective attacks.   
3
 See, e.g., Eq. (F.2) in [50], which is used to sample the Binomial 
distribution as in the Clopper-Pearson estimation method. 
inequality would be: |?∗ ? ?| ≤ ??/2 ln?1/??, which holds 
with probability 1 − 2?.  
Here, we do a similar operation using the CP method instead, 
applied to a (permuted or non-permuted) BI distribution, and 
numerical optimization, as explained in Section II.B. 
Specifically, given ? counts from ? pulses, the average 
detection probability is ? = ?/? and the bounds are ?, ?, 
obtained with confidence 1 − 2? using the CP method. Hence, 
because ? is constant, we also have |?∗ ? ?| ? ?|?∗ ? ?| ≤
??? ? ??. The bounds ?????, ????? and ????? in Table I are 
obtained in this way. The last one, ?????, upper bounds the ratio ????/???? , i.e., the bit error rate (BER) in the ? basis.4 These 
bounds are used, in turn, to estimate parameters that are not 
directly measurable, like ????? and ???,???? . This is done through 
constrained optimization [53], as described in points ?. 2 and ?. 3 of the protocol. An example of optimization problem 
solved in our system is as follows [49]: 
min? ????? , (10) 
where Γ is a set of constraints determined by: the measured 
quantities; the usual positivity and completeness conditions for 
probabilities; the following decoy-state QKD relations: 
????? ≤ ???? ?
?
?! ?????? ≤ ??
???				?? = {?, ?, ?}?. (11) 
The optimization problem is linear and so efficiently solved. In 
the estimation of ?????, three two-side nontrivial constraints are 
involved. Hence the overall ?-value for the simultaneous 
fulfillment of all constraints is conservatively bounded as 6?. 
With optimization problems similar to the one in Eqs. (10), 
(11), ?-photon yields (? = {0,1}) in any basis can be obtained. 
C. Upper bound to the phase error rate 
Numerical optimization is also used to upper bound the 1-
photon quantum bit error rate (QBER) in the minority basis ? 
by solving the following problem: 
 max?? ????,???? 		, (12) 
where Γ′ contains the same constraints as for ?????, plus the 
following one: 
 ???? ???! ?????????,????? ≤ ??
???. (13) 
The above problem can be reduced to the following bound [49]: 
????,????  ≤ ????,????  
= ????????? − 12?????? ??	??????? 	. 
(14) 
Nine two-side and one one-side nontrivial constraints are 
4
 Notice that this is different from the more common ratio 	????/???? known as “quantum bit error rate” (QBER) [33], [34]. 
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involved in achieving this bound starting from the optimization 
problem in Eqs. (12) and (13). By weighting each of them with 
the same ? value, we obtain that Eq. (14) holds with confidence 1 − 19?. To make the connection with security, we need to 
estimate the 1-photon phase error rate in the ? basis, ???,???? . For 
single photons, QKD theory guarantees that the asymptotic 
values of the QBER in the basis ? and the phase error rate in 
the basis ? are the same: 
 ????,???? ∗ = ???,???? ∗	. (15) 
On the other side, the asymptotic value of a certain quantity 
coincides with its true value, and we know from the CP method 
that the QBER true value is bounded by ????,????  with confidence 1 − 19?. Therefore, the phase error rate is bounded by the same 
quantity with the same confidence: 
 ???,???? ≤ ????,???? 	. (16) 
Let us recall that this bound holds for both BI and HG 
distributions, because of the presence of the Ahrens map. In 
order to relate it to the security proof of [35] and [38], we need 
to add some details. 
First, in Ref. [35] it is not the true value of the phase error 
rate to be used, but rather the bound to the phase error rate that 
a hypothetical observer would see if he tested a finite sample of 
size ????? in a population of ????? + ????? elements. Let us call ???,????  such a bound. We show here that ????,????  is a more 
conservative bound than ???,???? , i.e., ???,???? ≤ ????,???? . This implies 
that Eq. (16) still holds. Because ????? ≥ ????? ≫ ????? ≥ ????? 
(point III.D.2 of the protocol) we have that ???,???? ≤ ????,???? , 
where ????,????  is estimated from ????? single photons. We also 
have that ????,???? ≤ ????,????  because, by negating this statement, we 
would obtain the absurd result that a bound estimated from a 
certain amount of coherent states via the decoy-state technique 
is tighter than one estimated directly from the same amount of 
single-photon states. This proves our statement. 
Second, differently from [38], we keep the quality factor ? of 
Eq. (1) in the estimation of the smooth min entropy via the 
uncertainty principle (compare with Appendix B in [38]). This 
leads to the factor ?????? in Eq. (8). 
Third, we recalculate the bound to the smooth max-entropy 
according to the argument given in [35]. For that, we notice that 
all the steps in the supplementary materials of [35] can be 
repeated with the Serfling inequality [52] replaced by the CP 
confidence interval. In particular, the total number ???,? of ? 
phase errors can be bounded as: 
 ???,? ≤ ??????????,?	?	, (17) 
with ????,? a predetermined threshold larger than ????,???? +
??1/??????	. In turn, this implies that the smooth max-entropy is 
upper bounded by: 
 ?????ℎ?????,??	, (18) 
where ℎ is the truncated binary entropy function. It could be 
worth remarking that Eq. (18) contains the upper bound to ?????, 
which is clearly more conservative than the lower bound ????? 
present in [38].  
V. CONCLUSION 
In this work, we extended the security proof of the efficient 
decoy-state BB84 protocol for QKD presented in [24] to cover 
the most general attack allowed by the laws of physics. We also 
added extra features to the protocol, like the possibility to drop 
the assumption of a perfect state preparation at Alice’s side. 
This imperfection is included in the quality factor ?, which 
should be characterized by the users beforehand in a safe 
location. 
Given the wider security range of the protocol, it is natural to 
ask whether its key rate is degraded respect to previous 
realizations. In Table II, we report values for the new protocol 
key rate versus optical fibre distance, and compare it with the 
protocol in [24], secure against collective attacks. At 50 km, the 
new protocol still provides beyond 1Mbps rate with 22.5% 
detection efficiency, well within the reach of current detectors 
[54]-[56]. Furthermore, the maximum achievable distance is 
more than 110 km. The new protocol compares well against the 
one in [24], whose key rate is recalculated and given in Table 
II, featuring on average only a 10% reduction. 
The proof method in [35], adopted in our analysis, entails a 
reduced sensitivity to finite-size effects. The term ∆ in Eq. (9) 
does not include the detrimental contribution proportional to the 
square root of the length of the raw key, ????? , which was 
present in [24]. In Fig. 2, we numerically simulate the secure 
TABLE II 
SECURE KEY RATE VERSUS DISTANCE 
Distance (km) Key rate (bps) 
General attacks  
Key rate(bps) 
Collective attacks 
30	 3,124,188	 3,413,432	
50	 1,128,172	 1,251,857	
70	 364,787	 414,334	
90	 82,997	 98,112	
110	 1,448	 1,589	
Table II. Secure key rates versus optical fiber distance for the protocol of 
this work, secure against general attacks (column 2) and the one in [24], 
secure against collective attacks (column 3). In the new protocol, secure bits 
are distilled from the ? basis only, while both ? and ? bases contribute to 
them in [24]. For the simulation, the quality factor ? has been set equal to 1 
and optical fiber attenuation equal to 0.2 dB/km. ???? = 10??? and ???? =10???. Detectors efficiency is 22.5%, afterpulse probability 5%, dark count 
probability/gate/detector 2.1× 10??, number of detectors 2. Total insertion 
loss at receiver is 3dB. The acquisition time is 20 minutes. The values ??, ??, ? are optimized at every distance. At 50 km, they are: ?? =0.036, ?? ={0.935, 0.028, 0.037}, ? ={0.415, 0.05, 10-4}, for the new protocol, 
and ?? =0.013, ?? ={0.979, 0.011, 0.01}, ? ={0.418, 0.03, 10-4}, for the 
one in [24].  
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key rate of the protocol (vertical axis) versus the size of the data 
block (top horizontal axis), which is varied by acting on the 
acquisition time (bottom horizontal axis). It can be seen that up 
to a block size of 105, the key rate remains at more than 20% its 
asymptotic value. The minimum size of the sample providing a 
positive key rate is 1.6 × 10? bits.  
Overall, the performance of the here-presented decoy-state 
efficient BB84 protocol is comparable with what reported in the 
past [24], despite the wider class of attack covered in the new 
protocol and the single basis used to distill secure key bits. This 
is mainly due to the substantially unchanged numerical 
optimization in the parameter estimation stage. It still runs 
based on sampling from a Binomial distribution, which can be 
accomplished efficiently in several existing software packages. 
The gap between the Binomial and the Hypergeometric 
distributions, relevant for going from collective to general 
attacks, is bridged by the Ahrens map [40], that can be run 
automatically as a sub-routine of the numerical optimization 
program. We expect this to become a useful tool in other 
quantum communications protocols. 
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